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:;: 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR.' ) 
' ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, and 
DONALD S. 
vs. 
TENNESSEE 
COHEN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
CIVIL ACTION 
) 
NO. 3-76-48 
) 
VALLEY AUTHORITY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
TRIAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS, 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J.B. 
PLATEJ.5. AND DONALD S. ·coHEN 
·· A SECTION I. ': . 
,, 
Initially, counsel for the plaintiffs felt that the 
issues stated by the parties in the Pre-Trial Order adequately 
presented the problem to the Court. However, since the filing 
·' of this case on February 18, 1976, the hearing on the temporary 
injunction on February 25, 1976, and the Pre-Trial Conference 
(t held on March 17, 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1 
: on March 25, 1976, issued an opinion in the case of National 
• Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, copy of entire opinion attached 
, with emphasis added, where the Court definitively dealt with 
:i 
!J 
certain of these issues and priorities and thus, counsel for 
plaintiffs contends the Court and the parties in this cause are 
required to restructure the isBues to be considered by the Court. 
No longer is it an issue concerning the weighing, substantively, 
of the merits or benefits of the Tellico Dam or Project versus 
the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. No longer is it 
appropriate to consider that the Tellico Project is more than 
60% complete or that TVA has spent a certain amount of money 
on the project. To do so would permit all parties to present 
'1 extensive proof concerning the merits or detriments of the q 
:; Tellico Dam and Tellico Project and thus, in reality, reopen ,, 
the whole issue of environmental impact and permit the retrial 
:: of the Tellico Dam . (NEPA) cases previously tried by this Court. 
;! 
I 
,, 
Rather, the issues succinctly stated should be: 
1. Whether the closure of the Tellico Dam and the 
consequent creation of the Tellico reservoir will jeopardize 
the existence of an endangered species, the Snail Darter, or 
' 
destroy or modify the critical habitat of such endangered species.j 
2. If so, will such violation of the Endangered 
Species Act require the Court to issue an injunction to enforce 
the Endangered Species Act? 
We must keep in mind that the plaintiffs are not 
attacking the Tellico Project itself, but only that part, the 
Dam and resulting reservoir, which would jeopardize the Snail 
;j 
Darter and destroy or modify adversely the critical habitat of 
1 
': the Snail Darter. The key reason that such jeopardy, destruction 
II 
or modification will occur, as the proof will clearly demonstrate,! 
! is that the creation of the reservoir will destroy and modify 
i the habitat, that is, the sandy, gravel substrate on the bottom 
' 1 
of the river, in such a way that the Snail Darter can no longer 
reproduce and thus continue to survive. 
!I As the Secretary of the Interior determined in the 
listing of the Snail Darter as an endangered species: "The 
proposed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam 
!' would result in total destruction of the Snail Darter's habitat." 
\I 
: On April 1, 1976, the Secretary of the Interior determined that 
the critical habitat of the Snail Darter was from river mile 
i' 
~~ 0. 5 to river mile 17 in the Little Tennessee River. 
i' 
:! attached from Federal Register). 
i\ 
jl 
:i 
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(See 
The Coleman case clearly and specifically discusses , 
I 
i 
certain of these issues with which the parties have been wrestling!. 
For example, it is not enough to merely mention and refer to 
1. 
. l,l ,, 
certain detriments and benefits of a project in an environmental 
, impact statement. 
j: 
Rather, as the Fifth Circuit held on page 
I 
: 2571, 2572 and 2573: 
li 
I! 
!i 
~ ! 
'i I· 
I' 
. ,, 
[l 
'i I 
1 ~ 
i: 
il 
'I I-
Ii 
t: 
:i 
I' 
' '· 
In holding that the appellees have"adequately 
considered" the effects of the highway on the 
crane, the district court misconstrued the 
directive of§ 7. As we have pointed out, § 7 
imposes on all federal agencies the mandatory. 
obligation to insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by them does not jeopardize 
the existence of an endangered species or destroy 
critical habitat of such species. See text 
accompanying note 16 supra. Although the FEIS 
and the administrative record indicates that 
the appellees have recognized and considered 
the danger the highway poses to the crane, 
they have failed to take the necessary steps 
"to insure" that the highway will not jeopardize 
the crane or modify its habitat. 
This reliance on the proposed actions of other 
agencies does not satisfy the FHWA's burden of 
insuring that its actions will not jeopardize 
the continued existence of the crane. Further, 
even if these actions were taken the Dep~rtment 
of Interior has determined that approximately 
100,000 acres of habitat in Jackson County is 
critical within the meaning of§ 7, whereas 
the refuge proposed by the Fish and Wildlife 
Service contains only 11,300 acres, note 4, 
supra, and accompanying text. The appellees 
argue that their concern for the crane is also 
demonstrated by the fact that the highway will 
cross the proposed refuge at its narrowest 
point. Under § 7, however, the relevant consid-
eration is the area detemined by the Secretary 
of Interior as "critical habitat" for the crane, 
note 9, supra, and accompanying text. 
The duty of the appellees is to insure that their 
actions will not destroy or modify this "critical 
habitat", and not just the area within the habitat 
of the crane to be set aside as a refuge .... 
Hence, irrespective of the past actions of others 
the appellees have a duty to insure that the 
highway and the development generated by it do 
not further threaten the crane and its habitat. 
fl Further, in this cause, TVA has totally failed to aver or allege 
that it has carried out its mandatory duty to insure that its 
1 actions will not jeopardize the existence of the Snail Darter 
~ ; 
- 3 -
l 
.:_ -'-' ' ,_..,: --~-·-=-
i: 
' ,, ,, 
il 
~ i 
or destroy or modify its critical habitat. 
We must also keep in mind that the Endangered Species 
Act makes it unlawful to take a species or harass or harm it. 
!i (See 1532 [ 14]) . 
/: 
•i 
I 
The plaintiffs assert, and this court has already 
held,that the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, 
applies in its terms to the Tellico Project. After extensive 
review the Department of Interior has placed the Snail Darter 
., · Percina (Imostoma) tanasi on the federal endangered species ll) 
list and has officially designated the Little Tennessee River 
1 
within the Project area as critical habitat for the species, 
establishing the scientific fact that the reservoir would 
,', eliminate the fish throughout all or a significant portion. of 
its range. Section 7 of the Act prohibits such actions, regard-
' less of whether TVA is attempting transplantation of the fish. 
I 
is there any grandfather clause or implied exemption in the 
Act or in subsequent appropriation acts that would eliminate the 
Act's coverage of the Tellico reservoir. The Act prohibits 
federal projects which jeopardize endangered species or destroy 
habitat that is critical to the Snail Darter's survival. The Teflico 
\reservoir does both. The clear words of Congress in the Act, 
:: and the official findings of the responsible federal agency, 
1 establish a clear violation of the terms and policy of the Act 
and regulations thereunder. 
In light of the violation, plaintiffs assert that the 
Court should enforce the law by an injunction. If there is no 
i 
il :i injunction, the law will not be enforced at all, since damages 
\1 :; at law are irrelevant here. If there is to be any exemption 
1: ,, 
:at all, it should be the role of Congress to exempt the ongoing 
1 impoundment project from compliance with federal law. Based on ,, 
I' 
, the violation and Congress's strong declaration of public policy, 
)f 
j: there must be a very strong presumption in favor of enforcement 
I, 
:; 
1! 
- 4 -
of the Act by an injunction. The courts were not delegated the 
job of determining which species are "important" to the public, 
and which species the courts might consider silly or frivolous. 
This determination has been given to the Department of the 
Interior. Congress asserted a basic public interest in preserving 
I 
11 endangered species in general as indicators of areas of environ-,, 
i 
~~mental quality and public values, and gave them blanket protection! 
!' 
' Rather than having the courts undertake the essentially legisla-
, tive task of determining the public interest in an endangered 
species in a dam project area, Congress's policy should be 
enforced as written. The impoundment of the reservoir portion 
of the project (though not necessarily the entire Tellico Project) 
should therefore be enjoined. The question then will effectively 
be"remanded" for legislative exemption if Congress so chooses, 
!! weighing the relevant facts and policies. 
1, 
If in deciding whether or not to enjoin the impoundment,, 
this Court chooses to enter the complicated area of weighing the 
f: 
'' public interest in the Snail Darter's existence, it will be 
:1 this Court could not weigh them but only reviewed whether or 
~ i 
I' 
not TVA had adequately considered them. In this litigation 
under the ·Endangered Species Act, these factors can and must 
\) 
' be weighed in detail if the Court chooses to go beyond Congressionl 
1: 
al policy in balancing the equities. TVA argues that an injunc-
tion would result in more than $80,000,000.00 loss to the public. 
Plaintiffs will prove that, after an injunction preserving the 
present flowing river and preventing the reservoir is granted, 
I! 
11 more than two-thirds of the money spent to date will be retriev-
able to public use, and millions of dollars of public benefits 
will accrue to offset the remaining irretrievable costs. Money 
is one factor to be considered .if the Court enters into an 
I ~ 
extended balancing of equities, hut where an injunction will not 
ii 
:; result in large net losses of public monies, and where major non-
quantifiable public values be preserved, Congress' declaration 
- 5 -
of policy should prevail. Again, if a balance is to be made 
" between public policies and financial factors, that is a legis-
lative decision not well suited to th~ courts, and Congress 
should make it. 
Again, referring to the Coleman case, the Court 
r. 
;I there did not balance equities or costs but looked to whether 
'I d I! the appellees, Federal Highway Administration and others, ha 
complied with the Act. In that situation we were concerned 
with only 40 sandhill cranes and a fairly large habitat area. 
P SECTION II . . I 
il 
II 
il 
ii 
A. The Endangered Species Act Applies to the Tellico 
Reservoir. 
This Court in its Memorandum Opinion filed on February 
26, 1976, following the hearing on the temporary injunction 
'stated as follows at page 8 of said Opinion: "In the opinion 
11 of the Court, the Endangered Species Act does apply to the Tellico 
j: 
Project. " 
Further, the argument that the Endangered Species 
~ ' 
;1 Act contains an implied exemption for ongoing projects has no 
l!, ,, 
The statute on its face is clear, with a mandatory appli-
cation to all Federal actions. There is no grandfather clause 
or other exemption for projects that are underway at the time 
of the Act. Marty Federal projects are funded and commenced 
many years before their completion and to imply exemption for 
.: such projects would, in large part, emasculate the Act and thwart 
, its policies and purposes. This clear reading of the statute ,, 
is supported by administrative interpretation by the leading i 
I< 
I! 
rl Federal agency, and by the courts. The Department of Interior i 
' 'i 
!i has interpreted § 1536 as fully applicable to Federal actions 
which were planned or partially completed prior to enactment of 
' 
'r 1 the 1973 Act. Wood, § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: 
II 
,, 
!I A Significant Restriction for all. Federal Activities, 5 ELR 50189, 
li 
t( 
I 
I· ;1 
50196 (1975), citing letter of June 6, 1975, from Department of 
- 6 -
Interior to Department of Transportation. Since Interior is 
primarily responsible for enforcing the Act, that Department's 
: endorsement of application of the Act to ongoing projects is 
entitled to considerable judicial deference. Udall v. Tallman, 
381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Furthermore, in cases involving the 
Endangered Species Act, the Act has been applied to ongoing 
projects by the Courts. In U.S. vs. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 
:, (9th Cir. 1974), which involved the Devil' s Hole Pupfish, a 
:' 
two-inch fish which lives exclusively in an underground cavern 
in Death Valley National Monument, the Court enjoined continued 
pumping for irrigation which was lowering the critical water 
table of the fish. The ongoing activities involved a multi-million 
dollar investment and vested private property rights as well as 
Federal action. In National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 
(Civil Action No. J 75-129) (SD Miss. August 4, 1975), the trial 
Court was presented with a petition to enjoin highway construe-
tion through the only known nesting area of the Mississippi 
l Sandhill Crane, an endangered~species. The District Court 
refused to grant an injunction on the basis that plaintiffs 
! had not shown harmful effect on the species, and the Court did 
not hesitate to consider application of the Act to the project, 
on the ground that it was an ongoing project. Further, the Fifth 
Circuit has now issued an opinion in connection with said appeal 
i! and a copy of said opinion has been heretofore attached and 
~ ! 
II referred to. 
'! 
Finally, the allegation that the Endangered Species 
Act contains an implied exemption for ongoing projects is 
refuted by the reasoning of this Court in the NEPA litigation 
over the Tellico Project. This Court stated, "[T]he omission 
I 
I 
of the traditional grandfather clause in [the subject Act] as welli 
ii as the Act's stress on the inclusive applicability of the policy 
i ~ 
promulgated by the Act indicates a strong legislative intent to 
apply [the Act] to [ongoing] Federal action. II 
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and, citing Morningside-Lenox Park Assn. v. Volpe, 334 F.Supp. 
132 (ND Pa. 1971) this. Court stated that application of the Act 
" ... is required as to an ongoing Federal project on which 
substantial actions are yet to be taken, regardless of the date 
of 'critical' Federal approval of the project." EDF v. TVA, 339 
F.Supp. 806, 811, 812 (ED Tenn. 1972). The Court of Appeals 
1 
supported this Court, stating that "we believe it more consonant 
with Congressional intent to hold that an agency must [comply 
d with the relevant statute] whenever the agency intends to take 
steps that will result in a significant environmental impact, 
whether or not those steps were planned before [the effective 
date of the Act] and whether or not the proposed steps represent 
simply the last phase of an integrated operation most of which ~. 
was completed before that date." EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1177 
(6th Cir. 1972). 
Further, no exemption can be implied to the Act based 
! upon the fact of continued appropriations, or continued appro-
,, 
' priation for the specific project. The proposition that such an 
li 
'
1 exemption is implied for ongoing projects where Co11gress continues· 
1; to appropriate funds for a challenged project is strongly rej ected
1 
y 
:; in EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F. 2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972), where the Court · 
:: held that House Rule XXI specifically prevented such an argument. 
~ 
1 
House Rule XXI is specific in providing that in the case of 
11 appropriation bills, "2. No appropriation shall be reported in 
j! 
i; any general appropriation bill, ... Nor shall any provision 
in any such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be 
in order, . II (Emphasis added.) See 473 F.2d 346, 354. 
"An appropriation act cannot serve as a vehicle to change that 
I 
;' requirement [that a project be completed in accordance with 
,, 
'i 
·' 
' 
ii 
i! 
applicable Federal law]", EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353. 
In CNR v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, (DC Cir. 1971), the 
II Court found that continued funding of AEC tests did not void 
the need to comply with applicable Federal law. "Congress must 
' be free to provide authorization and appropriations for projects 
- 8 -
,!l 
'i proposed by the executive even though claims of illegality on 
i' 
11 grounds of compliance with NEPA [the applicable law in that case] 
'I 
are pending in the courts. There is, of course, nothing 
inconsistent with adoption of appropriations and authorizations 
i' L measures on the pro tanto exemption of validity, while leaving 
:: ,. 
i! 
1:, 
!' 
., 
i' 
I 
·' ll 
I 
any claim of invalidity to be determined by the courts." 
CNR v. Seaberg, 463 F.2d 783, 785. 
Finally, in the NEPA case involving the Tellico Project 
the Sixth Circuit Court specifically stated that: 
[W]e are unimpressed with appellant's argument 
that Congress authorized appropriations for 
Tellico in 1970 and 1971, even though environ-
mental impact statements had not been filed. 
To paraphrase Mr. Justice Douglas, ... 
"Congress did not intend, by approving funds 
for the [Tellico Project] to repeal NEPA as 
it applied to the [Project]. . . . " Other 
Federal courts have similarly concluded that 
Congressional appropriations for a project 
subject to NEPA are not to be taken as expressing 
any view with respect to compliance with NEPA." 
(Citations omitted). EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 
1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972). 
Defendants have alleged that conversations in the 
House Appropriations Committee constituted a specific exemption 
for the Tellico Project. This argument has no merit. First, 
'/ the potential conflict between the Project and the Act was only 
mentioned in the course of committee discussions ... It was 
never reported to Congress in floor debates, in the official 
!' 
i; House Report on the appropriations bill, and, therefore, Congress 
I' 
I 
could not even have considered the question passing the appropri-
ations bill. To argue that such occurrences constitute a 
Congressional amendment of the Endangered Species Act would be 
to invite legislation by subterfuge, by permitting implication 
1 ~ 
1 of statutory immunity for any potential project litigation 
mentioned in the course of a committee discussion. 
The cases cited above directly support this conclusion. 
ll 
il 
i' Appropriations bills cannot be held to create implied amendm.ents 
- 9 -
I 
il 
)! 
, to prior Federal statutes, at the very least not in the absence 
of some specific reference to the statutory conflict by 
'! Congress. Finally, it is to be noted that the alleged conver-
sations took place in April and March of 1975, seven months 
ri prior to the effective date of the Snail Darter Listing, and, I: 
I! !I therefore, were essentially speculative since no statutory 
: 
~ \ 
violation was possible until the Secretary had determined the 
applicability of the law. At the time of these conversations, 
moreover, the official position of TVA was that the Snail 
il 
!! Darter was not officially listed nor endangered and therefore 
!I that no violation of the Act existed. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority argues that the effect 
1
/ of § 1536 is merely to require consultation, instead of direct 
compliance with the Federal statute by Federal agencies. This 
1 
argument fails to recognize that § 1536 is mandatory in its 
': language, not only to consultation with the Secretary, but 
~ ; 
1 also actively "to insure that actions do not,jeopardize 
endangered species", etc. 
The penalty provisions of § 1538 apply to private 
H 
I parties; the only directive to Federal agencies appears in 
§ 1536 and if TVA's argument were to prevail, it would mean 
fl I! that no Federal agency has to comply with the Act. Furthermore, 
., 
§ 1536 does not "give a veto over any Federal project to the 
Secretary of Interior." All the Secretary need do is list the 
, species on the Endangered Species List. Beyond that it is the 
duty of every Federal agency as well as the Department of 
Interior to comply with the Federal law. 
ll 
:i 
i 
i 
B. The Reservoir Impoundment Violates the Terms of 
the Act. 
As heretofore noted, the plaintiffs will be able to 
definitively show that the creation of the Tellico reservoir 
- 10 -
I' 
with the closure of the Dam will jeopardize the existence of the 
d ,, 
i! Snail Darter and will destroy or modify the habitat of the Snail 
ll 
1 Darter. As determined by the Department of Interior, the critical 
.i , habitat is that area in the Little Tennessee River from river 
mile 0.5 to river mile 17. At this point in time, the critical 
[! 
i; habitat area of the Little Tennessee River is substantially 
ll 
il all, and at least a significant portion, of the range of the 
il 
1 Snail Darter. Even if a few specimens of the Snail Darter were 
:' found below the Little Tennessee River in the Watts Bar reservoir 
this would still not alter the basic situation with regard to 
the critical habitat of the Snail Darter and the fact that such i! 
I! 
" area in the Little TennesseeRiver is a significant portion of 
the range of said Snail Darter. 
We also have the concept of taking as defined in 
)I: 
ii 
'! § 1532, subsection 14, which means to harass or harm and, it 
is clear, that the creation of the reservoir with the closure 
(i 
of the Tellico .I ,, Dam will harm and harass the Snail Darter. 
' ,, 
I· 
>! 
It is the plaintiffs' position that this 'court need 
1! 
not redetermine the scientific facts of the Darter 1 s existence, 
,i its endangered status or its critical habitat in the Little ,, 
i! 
11 Tennessee River. These have already been established by the 
: Federal agency entrusted with such fact finding which should 
be entitled to great weight. On their face, these establish a 
,
1 
violation of the Endangered Species Act by the destruction and 
,, modification of the Snail Darter's habitat. We feel that the 
,1; ., 
:: defendant TVA will almost admit the foregoing propositions. If, 
!i 
I however, TVA takes the position that this Court should reopen 
the question with regard to such scientific facts, plaintiffs are 
prepared to demonstrate, based on the Department of Interior 
findings and extensive scientific testimony, that indeed the 
Snail Darter is endangered by reason of the Tellico impoundment's 
potential destruction of most or all of its known natural repro-
ductive habitat. 
- 11 -
C. SECTION III. 
This Court should enforce the law by issuing an injunc-
tion because Congress has declared the public interest in 
, preserving endangered species. 
In this case the defendants assert the equities of an 
ongoing construction project authorized (like all federal public 
11 works project~)/for the public good. Ordinarily, the issuance 
of an injunction by a court of equity involves judicial discretion 1 
in "balancing the equities." This case differs from ordinary 
cases, however, in that the most significant equity - the public 
interest - has already been weighed and legislatively declared 
by the Congress when it provided that the Act shall govern on-
going projects. 
First, in deciding whether the injunction shall issue, 
, there should be a strong presumption that a violation of a ,, 
11 
;! Congressional mandate should be enjoined. 
~ ' 
(See Section V infra). 
Second, moreover, in this case Congress has already made a strong 
declaration that the Endangered Species Act's protections apply 
II to all federal agencies and actions, including public works 
,
1 
projects. 
:1 
It is . . . declared to be the policy of Congress 
that all Federal departments and agencies shall 
seek to conserve endangered species . . . and 
shall utilize their authorities in furtherance 
of the purposes of this chapter. [Section 
2 (c)] 
by taking such action necessary to insure that 
actions authorized, funded, or carried out by 
them do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endangered species ... or result in 
the destruction [ ... of critical] habitat 
[Section 7] . 
i The legislative history specifically mentions problems with 
, highway and dam projects. This Congressional declaration of 
\i public policy is the most compelling element of the judicial 
balancing of the equities because it is a legislative determina-
.. tion which, in requiring that federal projects shall insure 
j1 
the preservation of such species instead of merely trying to 
- 12 -
I 
preserve them, sets up a policy priority for non-extinction of 
11 
endangered species. 
:I 
;j 
In the recent Fifth Circuit appellate Opinion on the 
Act, the Coleman case, for example, the Court enjoined an ongoing 
highway project (because it jeopardized, and destroyed a portion 
of the critical habitat of, an endangered subspecies of crane) 
without further inquiry merely because a violation of the Act 
had been found. (See Coleman at 2573-4). The Court noted that 
an agency's "concern" and project modifications were not enough: 
"§ 7 imposes on all federal agencies a mandatory obligation" to 
"insure"that their actions will not destroy or modify this 
'critical habitat' ... or otherwise violate the Act." Id., 
at 2571, 2572-73 (emphasis added). :; 
,I 
This principle is echoed in a line of cases establishing 
that where there is a Congressional declaration of public policy 
i~ priorities, the balancing of equities is not the same as in 
private litigation. Irreparable injury, insufficient legal 
v. U. S., 229 F 2d 124 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied. 351 U.S.' 
I 
i! 931 (1956). 
I 
:! 
In EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971), the Court held that violation of the NEPA impact 
statement requirement in and of itself required issuance of an 
:i injunction to comply with the law, even though the multimillion-
H dollar dam project was more than 60% complete (the project was 
i: 
!j permitted to continue only when the violation was removed). And 
II 
'I II such NEPA violations are only procedural: Congress's requirements 
i 
' in the Endangered Species Act are substantive and mandatory and 
thus even more deserving of injunctive protection. 
i 
:,! 
;; 
i; 
- 13 -
II ,. 
A. Congressional Policy Must Be Reviewed by Congress. 
It is no answer to argue that a protective application 
of the statute is allegedly frivolous in a particular case. 
,: It is Congress which declared the policy and Congress which should 1 
,, change it in particular cases. This procedure for Congressional 
[i 
,, 
'I ,, 
!: 
i' ,, 
review and judicial restraint is well established in environmental 
cases: In the Alaska pipeline case where a major project was 
enjoined in a time of national oil shortages, the Court of 
Appeals said: 
. . . We have brought to these cases an awareness 
of the severe impacts our ruling will have. 
Any decision further enjoining construction 
of this project will impose serious costs on 
the oil companies who plan to build the pipeline 
and who have made substantial investments . 
. . . The project means much needed jobs and 
income to the people of the State of Alaska, 
and development of Prudhoe Bay oil resources will 
bring forth badly needed revenues for the 
Alaska State Treasury. Recognizing these hard-
ships, however, we nevertheless are constrained 
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from 
issuing one of the permits which all parties 
recognize is necessary for construction of 
the pipeline. We have determined . . . that 
the grant of this permit constitutes a violation 
of both Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act 
and applicable Bureau of Land Management 
regulations (restricting the width of a right-
of-way). We base our decision on a literal 
reading of the provisions of Section 28, the 
legislative history of that section, and the 
settled construction of the administrative 
regulations. In brief, it is our view that 
the legislative history clearly indicates 
that when Congress enacted Section 28, it 
intended that all construction work take place 
(in compliance with the statute). Since all 
parties agree that construction . . . is im-
possible (without violating the statute) u we 
must enjoin issuance of this special land use 
permit until Congress changes the applicable 
law, either by amending Section 28's width 
limitation or by exempting this project from 
its provisions.u Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 
479 F.2d 842, 847-8 (1973) (emphasis added.) 
ii 
i). 
jl As the U. S. Supreme Court later noted regarding the case, the 
:I il pipeline was enjoined solely because of the violation, and 
!I 
::"Congress then enacted legislation, Pub. L. 93-153, 87 Stat. 
ii 
1, 576, 93d Gong. 1st Sess. (November 16, 1973), which amended the 
!' Mineral Leasing Act to allow the granting of the permits sought 
\! 
\ ~ 
I 
ii 
l 
I 
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' I .. l 
by Alyeska and declared that no further action under NEPA was 
iJ necessary before construction of the pipeline could proceed", 
li 
11 and the merits of the case thus were Congressionally determined. 
,I 
,I 
, Alyeska v. Wilderness Society, 95 S.Ct. 1612 at 1615 (1975). 
~ l 
In the San Antonio freeway case, the Court properly 
i 
:j p enjoined the ongoing highway project because of a highway act 
d 
:! violation. The question was remanded to Congress, debated, and 
I an exemption was granted. San Antonio Conservation Society v. 
Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971); and cf. 
;·
1 
P.L. 93-87 § 110 (b) (1973). In other cases (e.g., the Cross-
,'~ 
·' 
II Florida Barge.Canal) after debating the issue, Congress chose 
' I 
l 
q not to exempt the project from relevant statutes. In any case, 
'I 
the weighing of legislative policy should be done by the 
i\ 
legislature. 
Nor is it an answer to say that ci.tizens can go to 
Congress after courts refuse to enjoin a project: this puts a 
;I heavy burden on Congress by requiring it to act affirmatively 
:: twice in order to achieve a public policy - - once , to declare 
the law, and once again to declare that it meant what it said ,, ,, 
I 
lj 
i 
and intended the courts to apply the law in cases brought 
pursuant to the Act. The proper procedure should be to have 
ii 'the courts enforce Congress's law, and Congress may then act to 
exempt specific cases where and as necessary in its judgment. 
(See Alaska Pipeline and San Antonio cases cited supra). 
Further, to force plaintiffs to obtain a second declara-
tion from Congress imposes an intolerable burden on citizens, 
i! who lack the political and financial resources of federal agency 
·, 
II 
l! defendants. The entire purpose of Section 11 of the Act (16 U.S.C~ 
l ~ 
(: 
!! § 1540) which encourages citizens' public-interest suits to 
1\ 
enforce the law, would be rendered nugatory in any case in which )! 
courts refused to enjoin a proved violation. If the citizens' 
only remedy is to attempt to lobby protective bills through 
Congress, the Act's citizen suits provision and the protective 
role of the courts are rendered meaningless. 
!j 
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SECTION IV. Balancing the Equities. 
A. The Court should enforce the law by issuing an 
injunction because both Congressional policy and the public 
interest would thereby be served. 
,' 
I 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs do not consider 
it appropriate for the Court to probe into or consider the public 
, values, benefits, and costs nor the percentage of completion of 
the Tellico Project in order to enforce the law by issuing an 
injunction. 
J,• 
',I 
i' :; evidence to the Court· in this cause relative to the amount of 
To in any way permit the defendant TVA to present 
., 
I 
rl , money spent on the Tellico Project and the percentage of completion 
to date will, in reality, open up the whole issue of the benefits 
' and values of the Project versus the detriments and disadvantages 
! the plaintiffs also feel that they should be permitted to present 
L 
'
1 evidence concerning the benefits and detriments of the Tellico ' 
I ~ 
Project, a prospect which, in essesnce, will necessitate the 
:· Court re-trying certain of the issues presented in the previous 
il 
11 Tellico cases. This would also seem to be true that, if the 
\) ,, 
defendant, TVA, is permitted to present such evidence as above 
mentioned, the plaintiffs would be permitted to present evidence 
concerning the actual breakdown of expenditures on the Tellico 
Project and to show that of the $80,000,000.00 spent to date, only 
$14,000,000.00 of that amount has been spent on the dam itself 
' and would be irretrievable. 
TVA attempts to communicate to the Court that Congress 
itself approved the recent appropriations for the Tellico Project 
with full knowledge concerning the possible endangered species 
- 16 -
'I 
problem and the Snail Darter. However, when the facts concerning 
il this matter are carefully analyzed, as the previous arguments 
:I 
'I and briefs demonstrate to the Court, it is clear that only the 
subcommittees. were apprised of this situation and the Congress 
itself, by way of committee reports or otherwise, was not 
actually apprised of this situation prior to approving said 
budgetary appropriations. 
If the Court in any way considered factors other than 
the proposed dam itself and the relationsh~p of the proposed 
I' 
[! dam and reservoir impoundment to the endangered species problem, 
" :i li the plaintiffs contend that a significant number of factors 
I' ,, 
j) 
:j in weighing the project would have to be considered as proof 
II 
:: in this cause. Certain of these factors would be classified as 
'i 
,, public interest elements and are as follows: 
L 
(1) the important 
!i 
il 
II 
li 
il ,, 
': 
public interest in preserving unique ecological habitats and 
species, especially where they indicate important human values; 
ii (2) the importance of Congress's declaration of that public in-
terest principle; (3) the public values which wo~ld be 
obtained or preserved by an injunction maintaining the existing 
river, some of which values are economic in nature; (4) the 
.. public loss that would be caused by an injunction, especially 
the past expenditures which may be irretrievable. 
The fact that a project is 60% or 80% complete has 
no per se relevance to balancing the equities; relevance comes 
• I 
! 
only from the public interest imposed in the percentage of comple-' 
tion. To determine that public interest, a court of equity 
would have to seriously inquire in a detailed manner in the 
countervailing fact and policy issues. 
Some of the foregoing inquiry was raised in the prior 
Tellico cases, although this Court has never until now been 
required to weigh the elements of the project. In the prior 
Tellico case, this Court could only review the evidence to 
determine whether TVA had adequately considered it in its 
environmental impact statement; here the Court would have to 
- 17 -
determine for itself the public values on either side of the 
controversy. 
if 
(!, It is obvious that there is an important public 
1 interest in preventing the destruction of species and their 
' critical habitats. The public generally has begun to recognize 
the conceptual, scientific and societal importance of preserving 
the existence of endangered species for their own sake. The 
whooping crane, for example, has been the subject of enormous 
expenditures of public and private funds while offering no 
I economic value to society. 
il 
' 
It is also important to consider that the Department 
.I of Interior has made certain administrative determinations that 
:: 
1 
the Snail Darter is an endangered species and that within its 
critical habitat it should be protected. Such a determination 
I should not be taken lightly. As the Coleman case notes, the 
~~ Department of Interior determinations are in certain respects the 
I 
law of the case. This is particulany so where TVA does not 
: ~ 
i ~ 
!i challenge those determinations. 
Concerning Congress's declaration of policy, we have 
Endangered Species Act and its administration by the Department' 
!r of Interior clearly set forth by Congress and the Congressional 
11 policy in this regard explicit. With the Tellico Project, we 
do not have such a policy statement from Congress itself. The 
II 
I 
" 
only policy statement in general terms is from certain of the 
subcommittee reports. 
There are also important benefits to be derived from 
I compliance with the law as Congress promulgates it. To not 
'I 
:1 apply the Endangered Species Act to this situation is really to 
I ignore the Endangered Species Act. TVA argues that the Endangered 
I Species Act should not apply to an ongoing project such as the 
il 
I! Tellico Dam. However, the cases and authorities clearly demon-
d strate that the Endangered Species Act is directly applicable to, 
-1:8 -
·~ _____ ._,_,:, ,', ·~_._._:__:__'_._' '_: -·-~~.:.""'-~--·~_:_._:_:__~_:._.~.--~---...:~---~.:__._._·. 
i; 
;; not only contemplated projects, but ongoing projects. It must 
II p 
'.1 always be kept in mind that the Tellico Project and the Dam 
!I 
li 
I 
:I ,, 
itself is not even scheduled for completion until January, 
I 1977 • In the Coleman case, the right of ways for Interstate 
;: ,, 
lj Highway 10 had been acquired in 1970 and construction contracts 
n 
I! had been awarded and construction actually commenced. 
II 
It will 
II 
I ,, 
;l 
)1 
: ~ 
be noted in the Coleman case that the Court did not in any way 
consider percentage of completion nor costs involved in the 
project to dabt, but only the question of whether the actions 
:, of the defendants violated the Endangered Species Act and 
ll 
,! 
11 whether or not the mandatory provision, namely, whether the 
defendants had taken sufficient action to insure that the con-
tinued existence of the sandhill crane was not jeopardized 
!i ,, 
': and .that the critical habitat was not destroyed or modified. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the defend-
ant, TVA, is attempting to lead the Court down the primrose path 
•, 
,, by getting into these financial expenditures and percentage. of 
ll 
ii completion and also the question of transplants. For example, 
!I 
!i the issue of the transplanting of the Snail Darter has nothing 
il :1 whatsoever to do with the Endangered Species Act in that the·· 
~ \ 
,: Act is concerned with whether or not the Project will destroy 
or modify the critical habitat where the species naturally lives. ' 
!i As will be pointed out by some of the scientific proof in this 
ii 
d 
l
i) 
cause, the transplanting of one species into another area 
I 
: frequently and usually brings about the disruption of other 
ii 
I, 
!1 species in the transplanted habitat. 
Suffice it to say, if the Court opens up Pandora's 
box by giving any consideration to any of the financial expendi-
ture or percentage of completion to date and the related issues 
of benefit.s and values, we will be involved in extraneous issues 
and extensive trial time consumption. Some of the additional 
factors that would have to be considered in any such benefit and 
value analysis are alternative uses for the Little Tennessee River 
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; area, historical considerations, agricultural considerations, 
d 
" !,j archeological concerns, recreational and shoreline development. 
i! On the other hand would be the matter of loss of electricity and 
I) 
i' 
certain minimal flood control. In connection with the issue 
of alternative uses, it is important to note that in 1973 the 
state of Tennessee prepared conceptual plans and proposals for 
the management of the project area as a river-based project 
rather than a reservoir project. 
There is one further point that requires mention. 
At the hearing on the temporary injunction held on February 25, 
1976, it was presented in an unfortunate manner that TVA had 
i: sustained $15,000,000.00 in damages as a result of the issuance 
i' 
' by this Court of the first injunction. Upon taking the discovery 
depositions of the pertinent TVA officials in this regard, it 
il 
\ ~ 
•, appears clear that these were not actual damages sustained by 
TVA, but were their mere estimates of the inflationary value 
i•: 
' of the costs involved. These are not proper elements for the 
Court to consider by way of damages, and we hope tqe Court was 
not influenced in this regard. 
To go into all of the issues presented by this case 
would require an encyclopedic presentation. Some additional 
points and arguments will be presented at the trial of this 
cause. Suffice it to say, the most recent judicial determination 
,, 
'' with regard to the Endangered Species Act and the problem presented 
to the Court in this cause is the Fifth Circuit Opinion in the 
Coleman case, a copy of the entire Opinion being attached to 
this Brief. 
il 
Suffice it to say, in conclusion, there are other 
il 
lj issues of importance in society than mere concrete and steel. 
ii 
!j The preservation of species which are endangered has been declared! 
II 
II 
1! by Congress to be a worthy purpose and is a factor which is 
1\ 
ll i, becoming more and more crucial in our urban society and develop-
li 
q 
L ment. 
ji 
I 
ii 
I 
I 
' i) 
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